

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W

-----079986 071505Z /42

P 071437Z DEC 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3811

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 11685

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON PLENARY, DECEMBER 6, 1977

- (SALT TWO-1525)

REFS: A. SALT TWO-1529

B. SALT TWO-1530

C. SALT TWO-1531

1. AT DECEMBER 6 PLENARY (SENATORS CULVER AND HART, REPRESENTATIVE WILSON PRESENT), I PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II.3 (REFTEL A) THAT THE CRITERIA TO BE USED TO MAKE CASE-BY-CASE DETERMINATIONS OF WHICH TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN FUTURE HAVE CAPABILITIES SIMILAR OR SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF CURRENT HEAVY BOMBERS BE AGREED UPON IN THE SCC.

2. IN HIS STATEMENT (REFTEL B) SEMENOV TABLED NEW LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE VIII SIMPLIFYING SOVIET POSITION LIMITING LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES TO BOMBERS (REFTEL C). SECOND PORTION NOTED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TREAT PRENOTIFICATION

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OF ICBM LAUNCHES IN TREATY. FINAL PORTION CITED PROVISIONS OF JDT DEALING WITH MOBILES AS AGREED AD REFERENDUM.

3. IN BILATERAL, SEMENOV INDICATED THAT HEAVY BOMBER ISSUE OF "CAPABILITIES" VERSUS "CHARACTERISTICS" IS SEMANTIC. HE LISTED SOVIET PROPOSALS TO WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, THE US OWES RESPONSES (HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITION, NON-

CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER, ADVANCE WORK IN SCC REGARDING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND ADVANCED NOTIFICATION OF ICBM LAUNCHES). HE COMMENTED THAT WITHOUT A CLEAR, PRECISE UNDERSTANDING ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER THERE WOULD BE NO NEW TREATY. IN RESPONSE TO MY URGING PROMPT TREATMENT OF DATA BASE, SEMENOV ACKNOWLEDGED "IMPORTANCE" OF CATEGORIES BUT QUESTIONED NEED FOR INCLUDING HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHERS AND MIRVED ASBMS, STATING THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT PROVIDE FIGURES FOR HEAVIES. IN REFERENCE TO REDUCTIONS AND THEIR TIMING, HE SAID THAT AGGREGATE AND MIRV LAUNCHER LEVELS ARE "INTERRELATED." HE CONCLUDED BY ASKING FOR AGREEMENT TO SOVIET PROPOSALS ON BOMBER VARIANTS AND PROPOSED NEW JDT AS OF DECEMBER 15 (NOTING HE HAD NO RESPONSE TO MY PROPOSAL FOR RECESS).

4. WILSON - ROWNY/BELETSKY BILATERAL. BELETSKY, IN WELCOMING REP WILSON, STRESSED IMPORTANCE SOVIETS ATTACH TO MOVING QUICKLY TOWARD AGREEMENT. REP WILSON RESPONDED THAT PROGRESS WAS IMPORTANT BUT THE MAJOR CONSIDERATION MUST BE TO ARRIVE AT A GOOD TREATY, NOTING THAT RATIFICATION WOULD DEPEND ON TREATY CONTENT, NOT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN ANSWER TO BELETSKY'S QUESTION OF MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES TO CONGRESS, WILSON SAID, TO CITE ONE EXAMPLE, HE BELIEVED CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF CANCELLATION OF B-1. BELETSKY REACTED STRONGLY AND GAVE LONG REPLY THAT CRUISE MISSILES

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ARE DESTABILIZING AND OPEN UP ARMS RACE.

5. CULVER - SEIGNIOUS - JOHNSON/SHCHUKIN BILATERAL. SEN CULVER OBSERVED THAT CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET LAND-BASED MISSILE CAPABILITIES WOULD THREATEN MINUTEMAN AND GIVE RISE TO CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET INTENTIONS CONCERNING LIMITED WAR. IN RESPONSE, SHCHUKIN NOTED FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN FORCE STRUCTURES OF TWO SIDES RESULTING FROM INTERNAL PRESSURES, HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND GEOGRAPHY. SAID US SHOULD NOT PERCEIVE SOVIET INTENTIONS OF FIRST-STRIKE BECAUSE OF THESE DIFFERENCES. SEN CULVER CITED US CONCERNS WITH PACE OF SOVIET FORCE DEVELOPMENT, AND OBSERVED THAT THOUGH NO SINGLE STATIC INDICATOR, SUCH AS THROW-WEIGHT, IS MEANINGFUL ALONE, ONE MUST CONSIDER OVERALL TRENDS, WHICH ARE DISTURBING TO MANY. CULVER FURTHER STATED US MUST EVALUATE CAPABILITY AND NOT INTENTIONS. QUESTIONED BY CULVER REGARDING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF DETERRENCE PHILOSOPHY BASED UPON MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, SHCHUKIN AVOIDED DIRECT ANSWER, BUT OBSERVED THAT CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY PROTECT POPULATION AND NOTED THAT IN HIS VIEW A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT POSSIBLE.

6. HART - PEREZ/KARPOV BILATERAL. RAISING ISSUE OF FIXED US ICBM VULNERABILITY, SEN HART NOTED THAT PRESSURES FOR M-X DEPLOYMENT FOLLOWING PERIOD OF PROTOCOL WOULD BE ENORMOUS IF PERCEPTION WAS THAT MINUTEMAN WAS AT RISK. IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF RATIFICATION, HART SAID CONTINUED US FREEDOM TO DEVELOP M-X AND CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. PEREZ POINTED TO INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY OF SOVIET APPROACH TO BOMBER VARIANTS AND CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS. KARPOV'S REPLY IMPLIED THAT

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P 071437Z DEC 77

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IF A TRANSPORT TYPE AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES WERE MODIFIED SO AS TO BE VISIBLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM AIRCRAFT NOT SO EQUIPPED IT WOULD THEN BE A NEW TYPE. BRINGING UP GUIDELINES FOR SALT III, KARPOV STATED NECESSITY TO TAKE BROAD APPROACH, NOT PREJUDGING OUTCOMES, AND IMPLIED THAT BROAD APPROACH WAS NEEDED TO MOLLIFY CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS WITHIN SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

7. MCNEILL/SMOLIN - OBOUKHOV BILATERAL. SMOLIN INDICATED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO STATE IN PLENARY OR IN COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT US QUESTIONS REGARDING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH PRODUCTION BAN ON SS-16 COULD PROPERLY BE RAISED UNDER ARTICLE XVIII.2(A). MCNEILL SAID HE DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL UNLESS SOVIETS STATEMENT INCLUDED EXPLICIT PRODUCTION BAN ON COMPONENTS SPECIFIED IN US PROPOSAL FOR SS-16 BAN.

8. ANDERSON - MIHNOVETS/BEKETOV - KOUKLEV BILATERAL.
KOUKLEV ARGUED THAT US DEFINITION FOR CRUISE MISSILE RANGE PLACES NO LIMITS ON THE MAXIMUM RANGE CRUISE MISSILES

CAN FLY. HE SAID CRUISE MISSILE RANGE MUST BE CAPABLE OF A MAXIMUM RANGE OF ONLY 600 KM OR 2,500 KM DEPENDING ON LAUNCHER. HE GAVE HIS OPINION THAT THESE RANGE CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE DETERMINED UNDER AGREED CONDITIONS SUCH

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AS 200 METERS FOR ALTITUDE AND STANDARD PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE.

9. NEXT PLENARY, DECEMBER 9, 1977. EARLE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 07-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Handling Restrictions:
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Litigation History:
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Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 SALT TALKS 1529, 77 SALT TALKS 1530, 77 SALT TALKS 1531
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 332646
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: COMMENTS ON PLENARY, DECEMBER 6, 1977 - (SALT TWO-1525)
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6c05160a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009